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BAD FAITH CLAIMS HANDLING-NEW
FRONTIERS: A MULTI-STATE CAUSE OF
ACTION IN SEARCH OF A HOME
RUSSELL H. MCMAINS*
I. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF ARTICLE
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL MARCH toward imposing
extracontractual liability upon insurers (both first-
party and liability)' has been frequently lamented or
lauded by courts and commentators depending upon
their personal perspective. 2 Insurance industry doom-
sayers and trial lawyer prognosticators have tended to
overstate the impact of such claims upon the insurance in-
dustry. But the growing prevalence of the assertion of
such claims warrants close attention by counsel and indus-
try representatives in all facets of insurance practice.
When the author undertook to update the available
treatise materials and articles on this subject, the author's
computer-assisted research revealed more than 200 opin-
ions since January 1987 on the subject of bad faith in the
insurance claims arena. More than 130 of these cases rep-
resent appellate opinions from the various state tribunals
* B.S., cum laude, 1968,J.D., cum laude, 1971, University of Houston; Mr. Mc-
Mains is a partner with McMains & Constant in Corpus Christi, Texas.
I First party coverage refers to situations where the insured seeks direct cover-
age for losses the insured suffers. W. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, INSURANCE
BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 3.01 (1987) [hereinafter W. SHERNOFF]. Third party or
liability coverage refers to situations where the insured seeks the insurer to in-
demnify the insured from a third party claim. Id.
2 See generally id. §§ 1.01-.08; Langdon & Sytsma, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing and the Pre-Adjudicatory Role of the Insurance Company Advocate, 45 INs. CouNs.
J. 309 (1978).
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and another 80-plus opinions emanate from the Federal
district and appellate courts throughout the United
States. Thus, by shear magnitude, insurance claims per-
sonnel and trial lawyers (for both plaintiffs and defend-
ants) must constantly struggle to keep abreast of the ebb
and flow of such litigation in their own jurisdiction.
The following materials are not designed to rehash
comprehensively all of the developing jurisprudence in
the many jurisdictions that are confronting these issues.
Rather, it is the author's intent to provide an analytical
overview of the differential treatment of the common and
recurring issues in this developing area with a view to-
wards identifying the overriding judicial concerns. The
author also intends to focus upon hitherto obscured is-
sues that may well be outcome-determinative in any par-
ticular case. In this latter regard, the author was shocked
to discover that a critical segment of the applicable sub-
stantive law has been almost totally ignored by commen-
tators and treatise writers in the bad faith claims handling
area. 3 The all-important question of conflicts or choice of
law issues may be outcome-determinative and should be
examined by the thorough practitioner in advising his re-
spective client (whether plaintiff or defendant) and assess-
ing the potential for success of a particular extra-
contractual insurance claim. This subject is treated in
Section IV of these materials.
A third and salutary function of this article is to supply a
basis for a guarded forecast of potential new develop-
ments in the ever-expanding arena of extra-contractual li-
ability of insurers. But any such prognosis initially
depends upon a thorough understanding of the judicially
expressed concerns and policies that have driven the cur-
rent bad faith movement.
" See, e.g., W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1; Langdon & Sytsma, supra note 2.
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II. HISTORICAL RESUME OF BAD FAITH LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS
The roots of extra-contractual liability of insurers in
this nation run deep in many jurisdictions besides those
commonly classified as jurisprudentially radical such as
California.4 While California has significantly contributed
to the rather forthright statement of principles involved in
assessing liability against insurers above and beyond that
expressed in their contracts,5 many other jurisdictions
have, for several well-defined policy reasons, imposed
such liability upon insurers since the early 1900's.6 This is
true relative to the traditional extra-contractual liability of
insurers for third-party recoveries of excess judgments
against liability insurance carriers, as well as the more re-
cent vogue of making bad faith and other tortious claims
against first-party insurers. 7
All of the jurisdictions which have considered and im-
posed liability, as well as those which, for the time being,
have remained in the conservative camp, have relied upon
one or more of four inter-related justifications (with vary-
ing degrees of assigned weight) as warranting the accept-
4 See W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 1.01 n.3 (citing cases in 22 states other than
California which have recognized some duty of insurance companies to deal fairly
and in good faith with policyholders).
- See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973) (recognizing a cause of action in tort against insurer for breach
of duty to deal in good faith with insured); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d
425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) (liability based on an implied covenant
exists when insurer unreasonably refuses settlement offer).
6 See, e.g., G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1929) (stating that the court has a duty "to give effect to all
the provisions of the policy, and it would certainly be a very harsh rule to say that
the indemnity company, in a case such as this, owed no duty whatsoever to the
insured further than the face of the policy .... ); see also Barrera v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969); Duffy
v. Banker's Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913); Ryer v. Missouri State
Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 P. 346 (1925) (the "quasi-public" nature of the
insurance business imposes a duty upon the insurer to conduct reasonable investi-
gation of insurability after issuance of liability policy).
7 See W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 1.07[2] n.17 and cases cited therein for a list
of states which have held that a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
subjects the insurer to liability in tort.
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ance of extra-contractual liability claims." The first and
perhaps foremost recognized justification is the acknowl-
edged public interest character of the insurance industry.9
The place of an insurance company in modern society has
long been compared to that of a public utility insofar as
the enhanced requirements imposed upon such public
service companies is concerned.'" This comparison has
engendered the notion of good faith and fair dealing."
A second and related concern is the expectation of the
insurance-consuming public which the industry has fos-
tered itself. Allstate's slogan "You're in Good Hands,"
Travelers' motto of protection "Under the Umbrella,"
and Fireman's Fund's symbolic protection beneath the
"Fireman's Hat," exemplify the industry's own efforts to
portray itself as a repository of the public trust. But with
the public trust may be visited responsibility for a viola-
tion of such trust as evidenced by recent recognition of
extra-contractual "rights" of insureds or tortious respon-
sibility of insurers beyond the four corners of its insuring
agreement-particularly in the first-party area.' 2
Third, the adhesion nature of most insurance contracts
is such that policies are written in standard form and fre-
quently must conform to the dictates of various public
regulatory bodies. The courts have often referred to this
* See id. §§ 1.02-.05.
* See, e.g., Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d at 659, 456 P.2d
at 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 106. The court notes the long recognized "quasi-public"
nature of the insurance business, together with the state's statutory policies as the
source of an insurer's duty to its insured and the public. Id. 456 P.2d at 680-81.
- See E. PATrERsON, ESSErrIALS OF INSURANCE LAw § 1 (1935) (concluding that
although the insurance industry is not completely equated with public utilities, it
nevertheless "lingers in that twilight zone that separates public from private
business.").
" See Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the In-
dustrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1247 (1967). The authors state that courts "now
impose public obligations upon private undertakings [including insurers] in order
to protect the individual from the economically more powerful enterprises." Id. at
1265. The courts' strongest argument in favor of this imposition is that, by virtue
of its "public service" nature, the insurer has a duty "to render such performance
as fulfills the reasonable expectation of the other party." Id. at 1266.
12 See W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 1.07 [1], [2] for a discussion of the historical
extention of extra-contractual liability into the area of tort.
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adhesion contract analysis in distinguishing the insurance
agreement from an ordinary consensual arrangement ne-
gotiated at arms length.' 3 Indeed the almost universally
recognized principle that insurance contracts are strictly
construed against the insurance company and in favor of
the insured,' 4 is a by-product of the adhesion nature of
the agreement that fuels the "bad faith" fires currently
raging across the nation.
Fourth, and finally, a related, but nonetheless distinct,
acknowledgement of the fiduciary responsibilities of the
insurer (particularly the liability insurance carrier) has
served as a vehicle for imposing extra-contractual respon-
sibilities on insurers and has resulted in corresponding
extra-contractual recoveries by insureds.' 5
To these traditional policy justifications for imposing
additional liability and responsibility upon insurers must
be added the statutory and regulatory framework of con-
sumer protection laws enacted by the various states, in-
cluding the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act
recommended by the Council of State Insurance Commis-
sioners. 16 A number of jurisdictions now recognize direct
liability of insurers for a violation of these statutes or reg-
is See generally id. § 1.03 and cases cited therein; see also Arnold v. National
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987) (holding that the "special
relationship" necessary for the duty of good faith and fair dealing "arises out of
the parties' unequal bargaining power and the nature of insurance contracts
which would allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insureds' mis-
fortunes in bargaining for settlement or resolution of claims.").
14 See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 267, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1966); Healy Tibbets Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus
Lines Ins. Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 741, 749, 140 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (1977).
1.5 See W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 1.05. Historically, courts have failed to find
a level of trust between insurer and insured sufficient to establish a fiduciary trust.
2A G. CoucH, CoucH ON INSURANCE 2 D § 23.11 (1960). However, courts have
recently begun recognizing a fiduciary relationship between insurer and insured.
See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980) (punitive damages justified
when insurers hold themselves out as fiduciaries); see also Spindle v. Chubb/Pacific
Indem. Group, 89 Cal. App. 3d 706, 152 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1979) (insurer's duty of
good faith is "fiduciary in nature").
- Most states have adopted statutory schemes which prohibit unfair claims set-
tlement practices. Langdon & Sytsma, supra note 2, at 314; see, e.g., Unfair Claim
Settlement Practices Act, TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981).
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ulations enacted thereunder.' 7  Most jurisdictions hold
that the existence of such statutes and regulations does
not preclude common law claims.' 8
Texas is a recent example of a jurisdiction which has
straddled this issue. The Texas Insurance Code'9 pro-
vides a private right of action against an insurer who vio-
lates any regulation promulgated pursuant to the statute
or violates the contemporaneously enacted Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. 20 This statute
provides for recovery of treble damages from insurers
who knowingly violate its provisions. 2' Texas has not yet
absolutely recognized a private right of action for an in-
surer's violation of the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices
Act.22 Texas has recognized a carrier's potential private
liability for repeated violations of the Unfair Claim Settle-
ment Practices Act where carriers "commit or perform
[such acts] with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice. 23
The latter recognition of a private cause of action for
regular violations of the insurance regulations has the ef-
fect of putting in issue, in every case, the results and prac-
tices of the insurer in otherwise unrelated cases.
17 See, e.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d
329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979) (California Supreme Court expressly held that the
violation of the state's unfair claim settlement statute gave rise to a private cause
of action); Klaudt v. Flink, 202 Mont. 247, 658 P.2d 1065 (1983) (unfair claim
settlement practices statute does create an obligation running from insurer to the
claimant and breach of this duty is the basis for civil action);Jenkins v.J.C. Penney
Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981) (West Virginia Supreme Court
held that the state's unfair claim practices statute creates an implied private cause
of action). See generally W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 6.04[2](a).
to In many jurisdictions, the statute clearly states that it does not preempt rights
under common law. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972); FLA STAT.
ANN. § 626.9631 (West 1984). The Arkansas Supreme Court has confirmed that
the existence of unfair claim practices statute does not preempt the common law
tort action for bad faith. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281
Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463, 465 (1984). See generally W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1,
§ 6.04[4].
11 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
2 TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 17.41- .826 (Vernon 1987).
21 Id. art. 17.50.
' TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
2s Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1987).
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Moreover, the insurance practitioner may seriously ques-
tion the legal significance of distinguishing in front of a
jury an isolated act of bad faith from a regular course of
dealing. For example, how is an insurance manager, su-
pervisor or representative to respond to a question re-
garding treatment of a particular insured when asked
whether this insured was treated in the same manner that
the insurer always deals with its insureds or whether this
particular insured was singled out for mistreatment and
mishandling? The adverse risks of responding to that
question are evident. The avoidance of that risk is virtu-
ally impossible.
With the foregoing justifications and articulated policy
concerns in mind, a review of the recent developments in
bad faith claims handling litigation is appropriate.
III. BAD FAITH ACTIONS IN PRACTICE
In the course of reviewing the myriad of cases from
many jurisdictions, as well as the various treatises, one is
immediately struck with the recurrence of the particular
conduct that supplies a basis for the imposition of liability
both under and beyond the insurer's contractual under-
taking. These conduct themes overlap or manifest them-
selves repeatedly in the same case. Indeed, the first three
recurring conduct patterns that have been utilized to fix
liability upon insurers may actually precede the referral of
a case by the insurance company to its lawyer. Thus, the
industry must be particularly responsive to the early
stages of a dispute, either with its insured or a third-party
claimant, lest it be too late for an attorney to repair the
damage that may later ensue.
First of all, a number of cases have imposed liability as a
result of either no investigation or inadequate investiga-
tion by the insurance company prior to denying a claim or
referring it to an attorney. 24 These cases arise in both
2. See, e.g., Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Co., 86 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1936)
(insurer's failure to interview any of the plaintiff's neighbors before trial indicated
a lack of diligence in investigating the claim); Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort
1988] 907
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first-party and liability insurance context.25
Second, is the insurer's manner of evaluating a particu-
lar claim with regard to payment or settlement, whether
such evaluation is made in connection with a claim by the
insured or by a third-party claimant against the insured.
Insurers and lawyers who participate in the evaluation
process must be sensitive to the possibility that the meth-
odology for evaluation may well be second-guessed after
an adverse result in the ultimate trial or handling of the
claim at the adjudication stage.26
The third, and perhaps most frequent, source of the in-
surer's extra-contractual liability is in the arena of settle-
ment. Most jurisdictions have long imposed liability on a
liability insurance carrier for failing to settle a claim within
the limits of an insurance policy when the insured is ulti-
Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 240 F. 573 (1st Cir. 1917) (employer's
insurer negligently conducted the defense of a suit against insured by failing to
conduct adequate investigation of the claim). See generally Annotation, Liability In-
surer's Negligence or Bad Faith in Conducting Defense as Ground of Liability to Insured, 34
A.L.R. 3d 533, §§ 7,9 (1970).
2. See generally Annotation, supra note 24, §§ 7,9.
26 See Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d at 165. In this
case the Texas Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for breach of the
insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing where the plaintiff alleged there was
no basis for the denial of the claim or delay in payment of the claim. Id. at 167.
The court found that the plaintiff had produced enough summary judgment proof
to raise a material fact that the insurance company knew it lacked a reasonable
basis for refusing to pay the claim and nevertheless forced the plaintiff to a trial on
the accident before it would pay the claim. Id.; see also Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 9 Cal. 3d at 566, 510 P.2d at 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 480 (when the insurer
unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured, it is
subject to tort liability); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d
376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (insurer has an implied-in-law duty of good faith and
fair dealing to settle claims against the insured in good faith); Wolfberg v. Pru-
dence Mut. Casualty Co., 98 II1. App. 2d 190, 240 N.E.2d 176 (1968) (conduct
constituting fraud, negligence, or bad faith may make insurer liable for the excess
of a judgment over its policy limits); Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Casualty Co., 250
Iowa 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168 (1959) (court held that rejecting settlement proposals
which the insurer knew were reasonable and within the policy limits manifested
bad faith toward the insured); Bollinger v. Nuss, 202 Kan. 326, 449 P.2d 502
(1969) (insurer has a duty to consider the interests of its insured in all settlement
negotiations and must keep insured informed of all settlement offers received);
Boling v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916 (1935) (in-
surer assuming control of claim against insured owes insured duty to act in good
faith when settlement offer is made).
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mately exposed by settlement or judgment to liability that
exceeds the available policy limits. 27 While the standards
for imposition of such liability may vary by jurisdiction,
the jeopardy to insurers and its claims handling personnel
(including its lawyers) for failing to achieve a settlement
within policy limits or, at least to try, is almost universally
recognized.2 8
Closely related, but only recently enunciated as a basis
for recovery, is the liability insurance carrier's obligation
to defend in a manner that is suitable and reasonable
from the standpoint of the insured. Recently the Texas
Supreme Court recognized that the defense counsel re-
tained by the insurance company for the defense of the
claim by a third-party is but a sub-agent of the insurance
company.29 As a consequence, any defalcation of such
chosen defense attorney is an ample justification for visit-
ing tortious liability upon the insurer.3 0
An additional source of burgeoning liability involves
the denial of coverage or a refusal to defend the insured.
This often results in some form of settlement or arrange-
ment between the insured and the third-party, which inev-
itably operates to the significant disadvantage of the
insurer on all issues apart from the disputed coverage
issue.3 1
27 G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d at 544. As
this case indicates, courts have recognized this extra-contractual liability for many
years. Id.
29 See, e.g., Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987)
(court held that insurer was negligent for failing to settle claim within policy limits
where there was evidence that the insurer failed to advise the insured of any set-
tlement offer and failed to offer policy limits despite awareness that a jury verdict
would likely exceed policy limits). See generally Annotation, supra note 24; Annota-
tion, Recoverability of Punitive Damages in Action By Insured Against Liability Insurer For
Failure to Settle Claim Against Insured, 85 A.L.R.3d 1211 (1978).
- Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723 S.W.2d at 658.
-o Id.
-1' See, e.g., Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 292 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Iowa 1968)
(Iowa applies bad faith test to cases where insurer wrongfully refused to defend
and refuses to settle within policy limits); American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. John-
son, 177 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Distr. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 835 (Fla.
1966) (liability insurance carrier which defends insured and in bad faith refuses to
settle the claim subjects itself to liability for amount ofjudgment over policy lim-
1988] 909
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Similarly, an insurance company's cancellation or non-
renewal of a policy has been another source of bad faith
claims. This type of claim arises particularly in those
states with statutes requiring sufficient notice and/or
cause for cancellation or non-renewal, despite any con-
flicting policy provisions that would otherwise protect the
insurer.3 2
Even the initial placement of insurance may subject the
insurer to liability if the particular type of insurance
sought by the insured is either erroneously not obtained
or is improperly obtained.33 The acts of agents, such as
local recording agents, who have binding authority for
particular insurers may subject the insurer to liability.3 4
An overriding and recurrent theme for imposing ex-
tracontractual liability on insurers or their agents in per-
forming, or failing to perform, any of the previously
mentioned conduct is the concept of timeliness and dili-
gence.35 In recent years, astute plaintiffs' attorneys have
made time-related demands that whether because of in-
dustry inertia or simple procrastination have not been met
by the insurer and later result in disastrous conse-
quences.3 6 Similarly, in first-party cases the untimeliness
of evaluation or the failure to offer sufficient funds to
its). See generally Annotation, Insurer's Tort Liability for Consequential or Punitive Dam-
ages for Wrongful Failure or Refusal to Defend Insured, 20 A.L.R.4th 23 (1983).
-12 See, e.g., Spindle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 951, 136 Cal. Rptr.
404 (1977) (cancellation provision in a medical malpractice policy is subject to the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing). But see Gautreau v. Southern Farm Bu-
reau Casualty Ins. Co., 429 So. 2d 866 (La. 1983) (when an insurer includes in a
policy the option not to renew the insurer can decline to renew with or without
cause). See generally W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 330 n.3.
- Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1979)
(insurer held liable for policy coverage where insured relied on misrepresenta-
tions made by the local recording agent that the policy covered any loss caused by
vandalism when in actuality the policy did not cover such losses).
34 Id.
.- See Hayes Bros., Inc. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 634 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir.
1980) (insurer acts in bad faith by failing to settle the insured's claim); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App. 1984) (exemplary damages awarded
to insured for insurer's failure to settle claim within policy limits).
-- See, e.g., Hayes Bros., Inc. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 634 F.2d at 1119;
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d at 595.
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achieve settlement have resulted in insurer liability for
consequential economic damages for the perceived im-
proprieties associated with bad faith performance of the
insurance agreement. A recent lament sounded by a fed-
eral judge in Idaho is that bad faith almost always involves
the insurer's state of mind, and, thus, is particularly insus-
ceptible to disposition without full development by trial.3 7
The jeopardy presented by trial of a bad faith claim is well
documented.38
Apart from the recurring patterns of conduct that have
resulted in an insurer's extra-contractual liability as well
as the proliferation of claims in that area, is the issue of
who can be held liable and what persons and parties are
entitled to assert these claims. The obvious initial answer
to the first question is that an insurer may be held liable,
but that may include an excess insurer or even a reinsurer
depending upon the role of each carrier in performing a
function pertinent to its insured. 9
More threatening perhaps is the recent recognition by
some courts of the personal liability of claim representa-
-17 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Trumble, 663 F. Supp. 317, 321 (D. Idaho
1987). The court stated, "Bad faith connotes a state of mind, which inherently
and nearly always avoids summary dismissal in deference to jury determination."
Id.
See generally W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, §§ 7.01-.05, 8.01-.09.
See Pacific Employees Ins. Co. v. United Gen. Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 1022
(W.D. La. 1987) (primary insurer did not owe a duty to excess insurer to settle the
case within the limits of the primary policy solely to avoid exposing excess insurer
to liability); Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.,
667 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1987)(a primary insurer who breaches the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing due to failure to settle the claim within its
policy limit when it had an opportunity to do so, cannot recover contribution for
the excess from a secondary insurer); Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Prudential Reinsur-
ance Co., 196 Cal. App. 3d 342, 241 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1987) (reinsurer is not held
liable beyond terms of its contract soley because the original insurer settles the
claim in excess of the original contract); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins.
Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1511, 235 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1987) (excess carrier is able to
sue a primary carrier for failure to defend or settle); Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Continental Ins. Co., 308 Md. 315, 519 A.2d 202 (1987) (excess insurer had a
cause of action against primary insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim within
the policy limits). Cf Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Mission Ins. Co., 835 F.2d
587 (5th Cir. 1988) (excess insurer cannot recover from primary insurer based on
allegations of bad faith failure to settle a claim within the policy limits when the
primary issuer is not presented with a firm settlement offer).
19881 911
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tives or managerial agents of insurers.40 The potential ex-
posure cannot be lightly disregarded just because the
liability of these particular persons varies from state to
state depending upon the justification frequently recog-
nized by a particular state as the basis for imposing liabil-
ity. Depending upon the standard of liability imposed by a
particular jurisdiction, an employee or managerial agent
may not be immune from his own tortious conduct merely
because he is "following orders." The "following orders"
defense to the imposition of an individual claim agent's
liability was recently rejected in Texas in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Kelly.41 Other jurisdictions, however, have rejected
imposing liability on such individuals by focusing on the
insurer, who is the party to the contract and the entity
charged with heightened public interest responsibilities.42
Nonetheless, it is a sobering development.
The third group of individuals who is exposed to bad
faith liability and/or tortious conduct in claims handling is
the defense attorney. This is another sobering, but bur-
geoning, area of exposure to those involved in insurance
litigation.4 3 The magnitude of this risk should not be
taken lightly. The author was recently involved in an ex-
tensive piece of Texas litigation, which eventually resulted
in a settlement payment by the handling defense attor-
neys (that is, their insurers) of an amount four times
greater than that contributed by the insurer who hired
them. Thus, the role of the defense lawyer in settlement
negotiations and evaluation takes on added significance in
the development and prosecution of litigation.
Because of this exposure, the proclivities of defense
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d at 595.
41 Id.
412 See W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 6.05[2].
4.1 See, e.g.,Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968)(at-
torney appointed by insurer to defend insured, who continued as counsel after
discovering conflict of interest between parties, can be held negligent if insured's
interests are damaged by the settlement agreement); Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Guin, 723 S.W.2d at 656 (insured's basis for claim against insurer for negligent




counsel to protect themselves by advising and recom-
mending settlement at levels unacceptable to the insurer,
and consequently documenting the file, only increases the
risk to the insurer in the event of an adverse litigation re-
sult. Moreover, the role of the defense lawyer in attempt-
ing to represent an insured in a situation in which there
are manifest conflicts of interest between the insurer and
insured has resulted in startling new duties and responsi-
bilities.44 Coupled with an already increasing trend in the
legal malpractice arena, more and more jurisdictions have
recognized the absolute liability of attorneys in cases
where attorneys represent conflicting interests.45 In addi-
tion, the canons of legal ethics of both the American Bar
Association and most states which govern the legal pro-
fession recognize the insurance area as a case of inherent
(or apparent) conflict of interest. 46
Finally, another source of liability may be found in the
form of insurance agents and brokers whose errors and
omissions may be visited upon insurance carriers not only
through the common law, but through the application of
various states' consumer protection statutes. This is a
particularly troublesome arena of responsibility in cases
where there are denials of coverage or claimed applicabil-
ity of exclusions.
It is not just the number of classes of defendants that is
expanding, but also the classes of plaintiffs seeking extra-
contractual recovery. In those jurisdictions that recognize
a cause of action for bad faith or the like, the insured or
the insured's assignees have generally been held entitled
4 See Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133
(1986) (defense counsel owes a duty of full and ongoing disclosure to insured
when retained by insurer to defend insured).
4 See generally Annotation, Malpractice: Liability of Attorney Representing Conflicting
Interests, 28 A.L.R.3d 389 (1969).
4' MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983) ("When
•.. the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrange-
ment should assure the special counsel's professional independence.").
47 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d at 595 (insured entitled to protec-
tion under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act). See generally W. SHERNOFF,
supra note 1, § 6.05[2].
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to prosecute such an action. 48 Now excess insurers and
re-insurers have joined the fray against primary carriers.
This occurs particularly in liability situations where extra-
contractual damages are sought against the primary car-
rier or its agents for failing to achieve settlement or to
investigate or evaluate claims so that a settlement might
be achieved within policy limits. 49 Most jurisdictions that
have recognized the existence of such a cause of action in
favor of re-insurers or excess insurers have based liability
on a concept of equitable subrogation to the rights of the
insured.50  This is a growing trend evidenced by the
number of cases that have made their way into the litiga-
tion process and is of particular significance in fields, such
as aviation insurance, which are heavily reinsured in for-
eign markets. 5 1
Most jurisdictions have not taken the extra step of rec-
ognizing the right of a judgment creditor, either as a
claimed third-party beneficiary or otherwise, to sue di-
rectly for the fruits of an excess judgment. However, the
seeds of such liability expansion have been planted in ju-
risdictions such as Texas because the insurance codes fre-
quently do not limit the right to sue only to the insurance
consumer.
52
Perhaps the most divergent concept in the bad faith
arena is the standard of liability utilized to impose extra-
contractual consequences upon an insurer, its agents or
representatives. The standard most recently articulated
emanates from California and imposes a duty of good
4H Annotation, Insured's Payment of Excess Judgment, or a Portion Thereof as Prerequi-
sites of Recovery Against Liability Insurer for Wrongful Failure to Settle Claim Against In-
sured, 63 A.L.R.3d 627 (1975); Annotation, Liability Insurer's Potential Liability for
Failure to Settle Claim Against Insured as Subject to Garnishment by Insured's Judgment
Creditors, 60 A.L.R.3d 1190 (1975).
41 See, e.g., supra note 39 and cases cited therein.
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id.
.12 See, e.g., TEX INS. CODE ANN., art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1988). See gener-
ally G. KORNBLUM, M. KAUFMAN & H. LEVINE, BAD FAITH PRACTICE GUIDE
88 7:243-:260 (1986); W. KILGARLIN, M. KNOX & K. PURCELL, BAD FAITH PRACTICE
GUIDE, TEXAS SUPPLEMENT §§ 7:243- :259 (1987).
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faith and fair dealing upon insurers, both first-party and
liability carriers.53 California initiated this approach with
a recognition of a quasi-contractual source of such duty
that is applicable in all kinds of contractual undertak-
ings.54 Other jurisdictions have recognized this duty
solely in the insurance context for the policy justifications
that have been previously identified, including the public
interest character of insurance, the adhesion nature of the
agreement and the special relationship or fiduciary re-
sponsibility enjoyed by and imposed upon the insurer in a
particular set of circumstances.55
Classically, the issue of extra-contractual recovery arose
in liability insurance cases in which a third party claimant
recovers a judgment in excess of policy limits against the
insured. Many jurisdictions recognized that an insurer
had a right to consider its own interests in deciding
whether or not a case should have been settled at or be-
low the insurance limits.5 6 However, these jurisdictions
further observed that the insurer had an obligation not to
exercise bad faith in its exclusive decision of determining
when and whether a settlement occurred.5 7 Other juris-
dictions, such as Texas, recognized very early that such
liability for extra-contractual consequences could be im-
posed upon an insurer for ordinary negligence 58 - a stan-
dard generally considered to be a lower standard of
.- Gruenbergv. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d at 566, 510 P.2d at 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. at
480 (insurer must deal fairly and in good faith with insured and failure to do so
may result in a cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing).
- Id. 510 P.2d at 1040. The court stated that the insurer's duty "arises from a
contract relationship existing between the parties." Id.
. See, e.g., Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d at 165. See
supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy justifications
for imposing liability on insurers.
- See generally W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 3.02.
57 Id.
58 G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d at 547 (insurer held
to standard of care "which an ordinary prudent person would exercise in the man-
agement of his own business. . . "); Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beau-
mont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215 S.W.2d 904, 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (standard
of conduct to be followed by insurer is due care).
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liability than that recognized in the "bad faith" jurisdic-
tions. 59 While commentators and treatise writers fre-
quently articulate these characterizations of the
qualitative difference in the two standards, 60 most of the
courts, in practice, have considered that negligence on the
part of an insurance company is probative, if not determi-
native, of the ultimate issue of bad faith.6' Thus, the legal
jargon that attempts to distinguish between the two doc-
trines frequently resulting in extra-contractual liability of
insurers, or at least have been sufficient to maintain such a
claim, is a distinction that has become increasingly
ethereal.
Several years ago the California Supreme Court indi-
cated a willingness to go so far as to impose a form of
strict liability upon the insurer where there was a failure
to settle in derogation of the insured's rights.62 However,
the Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. predisposition for such a
result has not materialized and most commentators have
generally acknowledged that such a step is probably un-
63necessary. In most cases where claims could have been
settled within policy limits and were not, and the insurer
incurred excess liability damages, the insureds have suc-
cessfully tried and/or settled their extra-contractual
claims without the assistance of any further expansion of
the doctrines of insurer responsibility. 6
There are, however, further potential developments in
this area that, rather than being separate and distinct,
merely represent the application of an elevated standard
ml See generally W. KILGARLIN, M. KNOX & K. PURCELL, supra note 52, 7:69.
"" See, e.g., W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, §§ 3.03-.04.
' See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 236 A.2d 269,
273 (1967) (insurer's negligence is relevant in determining whether insurer acted
in good faith).
- Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d at 425, 426 P.2d at 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
The court stated: "there is more than a small amount of elementary justice in a
rule that ... the insurer which may reap the benefits of its determination not to
settle, should also suffer the detriment of its decision." Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at
177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
w. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 3.03[2].
See, e.g., supra notes 27-28 and authorities cited therein.
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of care that actually derives from the theoretical justifica-
tions for the imposition of liability in the first instance.
Many jurisdictions recognize the fiduciary character of the
insurance policy, both first-party and liability, and the in-
evitable conflicts of interest that arise between the insurer
and the insured in the handling of any particular piece of
litigation.65 In traditional fiduciary terms concerning a
conflict of interest, courts have generally recognized a
duty of utmost good faith and loyalty to the interests of
the beneficiary. 66 It is not uncommon in this area, partic-
ularly when issues of self-dealing by a fiduciary are con-
cerned, to impose upon such fiduciary the burden of
establishing the fairness of a particular transaction vis-a-
vis the person to whom the fiduciary duty is owed.6 7
Thus, in the insurer/insured area it is not unforeseeable
that the courts may ultimately and effectively place the
burden of proving the fairness and good faith in not set-
tling a particular controversy upon the insurer, with the
failure to meet that burden resulting in liability for the
inevitable and foreseeable consequences of such act (such
as the recovery of an excess judgment).
Indeed, many practitioners who defend bad faith and
negligent failure to settle cases already inform the insur-
ance company that the burden is on the insurance com-
pany to establish the reasonableness and fairness of a
decision not to settle. This is because it is obvious that the
consequences of failure to settle has resulted in some dis-
aster that the plaintiff will utilize in hindsight to impose
upon the insurer an unrealistic ability to presage.
The discussion of bad faith actions in their practical ap-
plication has thus far focused on the substantive princi-
ples that justify the imposition of extra-contractual
liability on the insurer. The greatest legal effect of such
recoveries, however, is obviously in the area of authoriz-
'1. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
69 See, e.g., Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (spouse
has fiduciary duty to dispose of community property fairly).
67 Id. at 370.
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ing damages that are not available in an ordinary contract
action.
First and foremost in the area of recoverable damages
in the liability insurance context is the recovery of an ex-
cess judgment against an insured.68 Courts frequently im-
pose this remedy upon an insurer without regard to the
capacity of the insured to pay the excess judgment, 69 and
perhaps even with covenants in effect pursuant to which
the insured may not ever have to suffer enforcement of
the judgment. 70 This is the most commonly recognized
extra-contractual liability form of damages. 7'
The second type of additional damages represents the
recovery of mental anguish damages that may be visited
upon an insurer both in a liability or in a first-party con-
text. 72 These damages are specifically related to the con-
sumer expectation justification for imposing bad faith
liability. 73 It is the peace-of-mind disruption that flows as
a foreseeable consequence of the insurer's failure to fulfill
the consumer's expectation in regards to the good faith
exercise by the insurer of its contractual undertaking.
This is a recovery that generally would be unavailable in a
pure contractual context. However, California and other
jurisdictions have justified recovery based on either a
quasi-contractual theory or a recognized element of tor-
See generally W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, §§ 3.01, 3.07[1],[2].
See Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957);
Carter v. Pioneer Mut. Casualty Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 146, 423 N.E.2d 188 (1981).
But see Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 92 N.H. 140, 26 A.2d 361
(1942). See generally Annotation, supra note 48, 63 A.L.R.3d at 627.
70 See generally Annotation, Value of Insured's Assets as Limitation, in Action by Insured
or Insured's Assignee for Liability Insurer's Wrongful Failure to Defend, on Recovery of
Amount of Judgment Against Insured in Excess of Policy Amount, 36 A.L.R.4th 922
(1985).
7, W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 3.07[l],[2].
72 Gruenbergv. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d at 566, 510 P.2d at 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. at
480 (damages for mental anguish recoverable); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d at 165 (damages for mental anguish and exemplary damages
recoverable); see also W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 7.04[2]; G. KORNBLUM, M.
KAUFMAN & H. LEVINE, supra note 52, §§ 11:42-:84; Annotation, supra note 31, at
50-51.
7.1 W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, §§ 3.07[4], 7.04[2](a).
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tious recovery.74
Third, and of equal impact, are the growing number of
cases recognizing the recoverability of damages to an in-
sured's credit reputation that inevitably result when an in-
sured is cast in judgment or incurs debt as a result of non-
satisfaction of a first-party insurance claim.75 In such
cases a growing element of recovery has been damage to
credit reputation, or even actual loss of profits as a result
of delays in payment (particularly in the first-party area).
Fourth, a recent case in California illustrates the imagi-
native approach that some lawyers, representing ag-
grieved insureds, have taken in the bad faith area. In a
liability insurance context, an insured sued its insurer for
damages to the goodwill of the insured resulting from al-
legedly unreasonable delays in satisfying third party
claims made against the insured and its carrier. 76 This is a
form of consequential economic damage that is separate,
above, and maybe in addition to, the actual payment of all
that is due under the policy. 77 Because of the overlay of
untimeliness and lack of concern for the insured's inter-
est, courts are beginning to authorize such additional ac-
tual damages.
Finally, there is a growing trend toward permitting re-
covery of exemplary damages against an insurer in a bad
faith action.78 In addition to the well-publicized Califor-
74 See supra note 72 for a list of cases discussing damages for emotional distress.
I. See, e.g., Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. 1981)
(holding that actual damages may include consequential damages for loss of
credit). See generally W. KILGARLIN, M. KNOX & K. PURCELL, supra note 52, at 11:55.
- Bodenhamer v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 3d 976, 234 Cal. Rptr. 712
(1987). The insurer issued to the insured, a jewelry store, a special business
owner's policy covering business interruption loss and claims asserted against the
insured by third parties. Id. 234 Cal. Rptr. at 713. The customer of the insured
complained that they had "ill feelings" toward the insured because of a fifteen
month delay in payment of insurance proceeds following robbery of the store. Id.
I1 d. 234 Cal. Rptr. at 716. The court wrote, "The express term of the liability
contract is to pay claims of third parties where the insurer is liable. An implied
promise is to process the claims in a manner which will not injure the insured,
which in this case includes injury to the business." Id.
78 See generally Annotation, supra note 28; W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, §§ 8.01-
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nia cases awarding enormous punitive damages, the au-
thor is personally aware of punitive damage awards of ten
million dollars against first-party insurance carriers for
delay in payment of a claim of only twenty thousand dol-
lars. Recently a court imposed fifteen million dollars in
punitive damages against a Texas insurer in a case
brought by a corporate insured. 79 The potential for astro-
nomical liability in these cases, while perhaps represent-
ing the exception rather than the rule, cannot go
unobserved or undefended by the industry and handling
counsel.
The recoverability of exemplary damages, however, is
frequently dependent upon the characterization of the in-
surer's conduct and liability as sounding in tort.8 0 There-
fore, the legal characterization of the responsibilities of
the insurer as contractual or* tortious has an increasing
significance in the handling and assessment of this type of
litigation.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHARACTERIZATION - TORT,
CONTRACT, STATUTORY
As illustrated in the previous discussion of the recover-
ability of exemplary damages, the characterization of the
nature of the action against the insurer may be dispositive
in a particular case. Such characterization, however, may
also be outcome-determinative in a context other than
simple recovery of exemplary damages or the extent of
particular damage liability.
Surprisingly, most commentators and observers in the
bad faith area have essentially treated as irrelevant the
question of whether the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing is imposed by common law principles under the guise
of traditional contract or tort principles. 8 To the con-
trary, the author believes that this characterization may be
- See generally W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 8.05[2], [3] for a discussion of the
relationship between punitive and actual damages.
See generally id. § 8.03.
"' See W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, §§ 7.03, 8.03.
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altogether important in areas other than simply the recov-
ery of extra-contractual damages and in defining the
scope of such recoveries.
Several recent cases illustrate this concern. The thresh-
old issue is the jurisdiction of a particular state over the
acts or conduct of an insurer concerning the maintenance
of a bad faith claim. A recent case in Arizona is illustrative
of a jurisdictional determination adverse to the insured
who had suffered an automobile accident in the state of
Arizona.82 The third-party involved in that accident
brought suit in Arizona, and the insured attempted to
prosecute his suit for bad faith against his home state in-
surance company which wrote and issued the policy in
Tennessee.83 The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the insurance covered the insured in any
state to which the insured might be exposed to liability
suit, i.e., a state in which the insured was travelling at the
time.84 Therefore, the court held that the Tennessee in-
surer was not amenable to process or suit in that state on
the insured's bad faith claim.85
Contrast this jurisdictional decision with one from a
Connecticut federal court which recently determined that
a Scandinavian insurer was amenable to process in that
state and recognized that the insured's potential liability
in any state was foreseeable by the insurer's issuance of
the insurance policy.8 6 Thus, the court explicity rejected
the jurisdictional plea of the Scandinavian insurer.8 7
The opinions of these two courts irreconcilably conflict.
82 Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 736 P.2d 2 (1987).
8., Id. 736 P.2d at 3-4.
"4 Id. at 6-7.
"- Id. at 8. The court concluded that Arizona lacked suflicent minimum contacts
to assert jurisdiction over the Tennessee insurer. Id.
.6 Teleco Oilfield Servs., Inc. v. Skandia Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 753, 758 (D.
Conn. 1987). The court held that the insurer's alleged tortious conduct occurred
in Connecticut because the insurer was required to pay claims under the policy in
Connecticut, and therefore failure to pay such claim is deemed to have occurred
in Connecticut. Id. at 757. In addition, the insurer was to send an explanation for
denying payment to Connecticut. Id. Finally, any misrepresentation by the in-
surer would occur in communications received by the insured in Connecticut. Id.
.7 Id.
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This is a new issue, however, particularly in the area of
aviation insurance. The question of amenability of for-
eign reinsurers of underwriters is one that may well
plague the aviation insurance industry, as well as potential
claimants, in the future.
Closely connected to the jurisdiction question is the
question of characterization of the basis for liability. If
the claim is characterized as a tort, the particular "tortious
wrong" may be sufficient to assert jurisdiction upon the
carrier in the particular jurisdiction in which the "bad
faith" caused injury or damage. It must be recognized,
however, that there may be multi-state, or even multi-na-
tional contacts by any particular liability or first-party in-
surer that are highly fortuitous. These contacts may well
give rise to jurisdictional defenses by the insurers and ju-
risdictional assertions by insureds or their assignees.
Similarly, reference to the characterization of the partic-
ular conduct in issue as being tortious or contractual may
determine the questions of which parties one may sue or
whether such parties are amenable to service of process.
Consider the earlier discussion about the liability of a par-
ticular claims representative or managerial supervisor. 88
This person may not have set foot in a particular jurisdic-
tion, but may have called the shots on evaluating or set-
tling a claim pending in that jurisdiction. The
characterization of the cause of action as one sounding in
tort or contract may determine that party's amenability to
process, as well as legal responsibility. The same determi-
nation applies with regard to the liability both for and of
attorneys representing the insurance companies, 89 who
may have an office (and be admitted to practice) in any
jurisdiction other than the one in which either the injury
occurs or the suit is brought.
A third issue relates to the propriety of party plaintiffs
and the question of the assignability of a particular claim.
While most jurisdictions recognize the assignability of
" See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
.S' See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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contractual claims, 90 some jurisdictions delimit the assign-
ability of tort claims. 9' Thus, plaintiffs must be wary that
how and where a cause of action arises or can be asserted
may determine the effectiveness of an insured's assign-
ment of a claim.
The question of limitations will also vary depending
upon the characterization of the action as contractual or
tortious. The initial characterization may govern the
availability and applicability of a particular limitations de-
fense, which, in general, would be a limitation statute ap-
plied by the state where suit is filed, assuming that the
defendants are amenable to process in that state. To the
extent a particular state, such as Texas, recognizes a statu-
tory cause of action arising under its particular insurance
statutes, the limitations provisions of that statute may well
be carried forward by the assertion of that claim in an-
other jurisdiction, thereby becoming a part of the sub-
stantive rights involved in the particular cause of action.92
Of course, the aviation industry for years has focused
upon, and dealt with, these questions in the context of
wrongful death statutes and determination of whether the
particular limitations provision of a statute is substantive
or procedural and remedial or prescriptive. 3
As noted earlier, the particular damages that are recov-
erable may depend upon whether the action sounds in
tort or in contract may thus be outcome-determininative,
particularly in the area of exemplary damages.
The most significant, but as yet unarticulated issue in
the bad faith area, is the significance of characterization of
the claim against insurers in determination of the choice
of law involved in applying the substantive principles that
control the progress and outcome of the litigation. Too
1", See generally M. KORNBLUM, M. KAUFMANN & H. LEVINE, supra note 52, § § 1.11,
7.216.
m Id.; see, e.g., Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 284, 132
Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976) (damages for emotional distress not assignable).
12 See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcTS LAw § 81 (1959).
1. See generally Kinzy, Current Aviation Decisions in Conflicts of Laws, 41 J. AIR L. &
COM. 311, 323-26 (1975).
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often, lawyers parochially review a case that is filed in
their jurisdiction as being controlled by their own jurisdic-
tion without identifying other jurisdictions that may have
an arguably superior interest in the determination of a
particular issue. Some lawyers never give any meaningful
consideration to this threshold and fundamentally impor-
tant question.
For instance, in a case involving a California insurer de-
fending a particular claim and making settlement and
evaluation decisions in California that affect a piece of
Texas litigation, it may well behoove the Texas bad faith
plaintiff, who is also a California insured, to sue in Texas,
but seek the application of California legal principles with
regards to substantive liability.
In crafting an analytical approach to these issues, the
characterization of the action is all-important in influenc-
ing the choice of law determination. Many jurisdictions
that have recognized the more modern RESTATEMENT ap-
proach of most significant contacts or center of gravity94
nonetheless adhere to the more archaic principles for de-
termining choice of law if the issue to be determined is
characterized as sounding in contract. 95 The options
available if this characterization prevails may be the place
the parties made the contract or the place of performance
of the contract. 96 In a liability insurance context the place
of performance may well be the state where the defense of
the action was undertaken. On the other hand, even in a
traditional conflicts analysis of the law of the place of the
wrong (if a tort characterization prevails) involving an
out-of-state insured (which is frequently the case in the
context of products liability cases), then it does not neces-
sarily follow that the place of the wrong is the place where
the product failed. It may well be that in the bad faith
!,4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(l)(1971). In absence of a
choice of law clause in the contract, the law applied is that of the state which "has
the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties ..... Id.
!I, Annotation, Conflict of Laws As to Elements and Measure of Damages Recoverable for
Breach of Contract, 50 A.L.R.2d 227 § 2(a) (1956).
96 Id. § 3(a).
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cause of action, the place of the wrong analysis would be
where the insured suffered economic effects of the mis-
handling of the litigation rather than where liability is ini-
tially incurred.
There is of course a predisposition by the forums enter-
taining these actions to apply their own law when possible
and, in fact, to engraft public policy exceptions to the ap-
plication of another state's law if such application would
adversely affect the policy interest of the forum.97 But
these are all factors which require the careful practitioner
to scrutinize the totality of the relationship between the
insurer and the insured, including the incident requiring
the invocation of the insurance coverage and even the
slightest of the various contacts involved in processing the
particular decisions. These are all factors that, if ignored,
may well lead to further disaster by the handling attorney
(representing either the plaintiff or the defendant) or at
least to missing a golden opportunity to apply different
legal principles, which could be advantageous to the as-
sertion or defense of a bad faith claim.
This author was appalled to find that while there were
three cases in 1987 which dealt with these issues,98 none
of the recognized commentators discussed these con-
cerns. This all-too-neglected substantive area of the law
may be dispositive in any particular bad faith case. The
author postulates no solutions to these problem areas, but
merely suggests that an analytical framework must be
fashioned by the bad faith claim litigator that accounts for
the existence and potential of interstate factors that work
both to potential advantage and disadvantage as a factor
in assessing litigation risk.
V. CONFLICTING INTEREST PROBLEM AREAS
In reviewing more than three hundred cases in the bad
117 R. LEFLAR, supra note 92.
!18 Teleco Oilfield Servs., Inc. v. Skandia Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. at 753; Home
Ins. Co. v. Service Am. Corp., 654 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. 11. 1987); Batton v. Tennes-
see Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Ariz. at 268, 736 P.2d at 2.
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faith area, the author has discerned that one of the over-
riding, though frequently and insufficiently articulated,
concerns expressed by the courts (and almost universally
recognized by juries) is the problem of conflicting inter-
ests between the insurer and the insured. These conflicts
may be heightened by the added conflict between the law-
yer hired by the insurer for the insured and the interests
of the hiring insurer.99 The greatest conflict of interest
area lies with the representation by attorneys who insuffi-
ciently disclose these conflicting interests to their cli-
ents-the insured. Perhaps the most common conflict of
interest situation involves a claim in which there is both a
claim that comes within coverage and other asserted
claims that are outside coverage.
Courts have often rejected the standard form unilateral
reservation of rights by insurers as not being fully respon-
sive to the needs of the insured to understand the limita-
tions that frequently are imposed upon lawyers handling
such cases at the behest of the insurer.'0 0 California has
attempted a resolution of these issues in a manner that
has been much criticized as unworkable.' California has
required separate employment of counsel for the insured
as well as a right of participation in both settlement and
conduct of the trial, though the correlative rights between
the two sets of lawyers that are hired and both paid by the
insurer is somewhat unclear and undeveloped. 0 2 The
state of Washington has recently articulated such a con-
cern in this traditional acceptance of employment by an
attorney in a non-waiver or reservation of rights type situ-
See Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 715 P.2d at 1133.
See generally W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 3.24[2].
San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 162 Cal. App.
3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984). In this case, the insurer reserved its right to
deny coverage but agreed to represent the insured on all claims asserted against
the insured. Id. at 361-62, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496. The court held that this situation
created a conflict of interest, and that in the absence of consent on the part of the
insured, the insurer had a duty to provide independent counsel. Id. at 375, 208
Cal. Rptr. at 506.
102 Id. 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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ation. 10 3 One can synthesize the concerns expressed by
the courts into the conflict of interest approach that high-
lights the tendency that is natural (but impermissible) for
an insurer to elevate its own interests above its in-
sured's. 0 4 In such situations Washington has responded
by finding an elevated duty on the part of the insurer and
its retained counsel to protect and fully inform the
insured.t0 5
The conflicts of interest issue manifests itself more in
the settlement area than any other. The simple and single
conflict between the insured and the insurer may be that
the claim is one which vastly exceeds or might exceed the
limits of insurance available to satisfy any particular claim
or group of claims. The courts have been particularly
sensitive to the interests of the insured in this context,
and have demanded that the insured be fully and com-
pletely informed as to every facet of the litigation, and
particularly with regards to evaluation and settlement. 0 6
This is simply not routinely done in the industry and fol-
lowing a devastating litigation result or lost settlement
opportunity almost inevitably results in the bringing of an
extra-contractual liability claim with consequent charges
of bad faith or gross negligence. 0 7 Liability for exem-
plary damages often follows.
This problem is endemic to the relationship between
,o Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 715 P.2d at 1133.
- See id. 715 P.2d at 1136-1137. See generally W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 3.22.
, Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 715 P.2d at 1137. The court identi-
fied specific criteria which need to be fulfilled for the enhanced obligation to be
met. These criteria include thorough investigation of the incident, retention of
competent defense counsel for the insured (with a clear understanding that the
insured is the only client), full disclosure to the insured of the reservation of rights
defense and of the development and progress of the litigation (including all settle-
ment offers). Furthermore, the insurance company must avoid any action which
demonstrates greater interest for the insured monetary interest than for the in-
sured's financial risk. Id.
"W Id.; see generally W. SHERNOFF, supra note 1, § 3.04[3].
107 Cf Continental Casualty Co. v. Huizar, 740 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1987) (insurer
argued that it paid judgment against insured under duress because insured com-
menced action seeking the payment of policy limits plus extra-contractual
liability).
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the insurer and insured in which courts and juries per-
ceive the insured (rightly or wrongly) as the disadvan-
taged party to the transaction. For it is the insurer that is
in possession of the policy limits and the information sup-
posedly necessary to evaluate and conclude a claim by set-
tlement. It is also the insurer that is exclusively vested by
contract with control of the settlement negotiations. It is
this contractual exclusivity that mandates exceptional at-
tention to the interests of the insured to the point of ele-
vating them over the insurer's own interests. Otherwise
liability will almost certainly be fixed upon the insurer that
proves wrong in its particular settlement evaluation or de-
fense decision.
Overlaying this inherent conflict of interest that arises
in the liability insurance context is the heightened conflict
of interest problem that depends upon the type of insur-
ance policy that applies to the particular case. For exam-
ple, the per person/per occurrence policies create
significant potential for the insurer to fashion the settle-
ment negotiations in such a way as to shave its responsi-
bility on its per person limit as to certain claims at the
expense of the insured rather than considering the settle-
ment of the overall litigation. In those jurisdictions where
the standard of care imposed is one of negligence, 0 8 it is
usually the question of whether the insurer exercised the
ordinary care a person situated as the insured would exer-
cise for his own protection. Thus, in a situation where a
particular policy has policy limits of $100,000 per person
and $300,000 per occurrence and three people are in-
jured and demand is made by a single claimant's attorney
for the entire policy limits, a predisposition of the insur-
ance company to attempt to bicker over one or more of
the claims is manifest. However, if one of the injured per-
sons is quadriplegic or brain-damaged (such that excess
liability is virtually assured) then applying the standard
principles of negligence to rejection of such an offer may
108 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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well visit liability upon the insurer simply because of the
conflict of interest presented by the policy itself.
Even more disastrous may be the consequence of poli-
cies that are couched in terms of liability or payment for
"ultimate net loss" which subtracts from the available lia-
bility limits the amount of fees or claims expense that are
incurred. Thus, the longer a case is litigated the more the
limits of a particular insurance policy are depleted, such
that there is a manifest conflict of interest between the
continuance of the litigation and the maintenance of suffi-
cient limits to satisfy any particular claim. This is particu-
larly true in those situations where such policies do not
have (as they frequently do not) a supplementary pay-
ments provision that would render the carrier liable for
interest accruing on any judgment that is rendered. Thus,
the maintenance of an appeal or a processing through fi-
nality of a claim that has resulted in an excess judgment
has the effect of continuously reducing the available limits
for the satisfaction of a claim while depositing the money
into the coffers of the insurance defense attorney at the
arguable expense of the insured. It is unlikely that such
manifest conflicts of interest will be treated lightly by an
ensuing jury determination of bad faith or gross
negligence.
An even greater problem is presented by policies that
are cast in terms of aggregate limits, which are "claims-
made" policies. There the significant item that the indus-
try and defense lawyers almost universally overlook in a
particular case is the determination of the total amount of
claim exposure insofar as assessing the available amounts
for settlement of any particular claim. The premature ex-
haustion of aggregate limits to the detriment of the in-
sured may also visit liability upon the liability insurance
carrier. It is not infrequent that, as a result of all of the
claims that have been made during a given policy year,
such claims are settled on an individual basis without re-
gard to the overall impact on the aggregate coverage
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available to the particular insured. Worse yet, the insured
is seldom informed of this plight.
It has been the author's experience that the handling
lawyers on "claims-made" policies generally do not even
know of the existence of other claims, let alone the rela-
tive exposure of the insured to such other claims insofar
as the assessment of the availability of particular proceeds
for the application to a particular loss. This again
presents an inherent conflict of interest that would at least
require disclosure to the insured. It is in the disclosure
area that the courts most often seek solace in visiting lia-
bility upon insurers, their agents, representatives and
counsel.
Finally, there are many insurance policies with large re-
tentions or deductibles that require the approval of an in-
sured for settlement use. This is used as a shield by
insurers or defense lawyers to the obligation to attempt to
settle any particular piece of litigation. Again, full disclo-
sure is the requirement in any conflicting interest situa-
tion-full and educated disclosure-so that the insured
can have sufficient information to protect itself adequately
when trying to make decisions.
A recently reported imaginative settlement arrange-
ment was litigated in which the entire problem of a de-
ductible was undercut by an agreement between an
insured, a primary carrier and a claimant. The
$250,000.00 deductible was essentially wrapped into a
settlement proposal wherein the insurer advanced its
$460,000.00-plus limits in return for an acknowledgement
by the claimant of satisfaction of the first $750,000.00 of
liability on the part of the insured. 10 9 The insured made
demand upon the excess carrier, who in turn requested
the $250,000 deductible contribution from the insured."
In response to that demand the insured refused and
- Kelley Co. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 662 F. Supp. 1284 (E.D. Wis. 1987)
(settlement agreement freed insured from paying deductible to excess insurer).
1,o Id. at 1285.
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sought a declaratory judgment."' It was then determined
that the self-insured risk, i.e., the deductible, had already
been settled and disposed of by the insured (despite the
failure to pay any funds) and all liability for the additional
agreed settlement amount was imposed upon the excess
carrier. 1 2  Such an innovative settlement tool by both
the claimant and a particular insured may well operate, as
is obviously the case, to the disadvantage of the upline
carrier. Indeed, such arrangement may also profit the pri-
mary carrier.
VI. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE CONFLICTS-
AGGRESSIVE PLAINTIFF STRATEGIES AND TACTICS
IN THE SETTLEMENT ARENA
This heading amply identifies the posture of the author
in the prosecution of bad faith actions. However, the les-
son that must be learned by both sides of the docket is to
be attuned to imaginative efforts to add to that body of
already existing law in the bad faith area or to move the
courts further down the road in the direction of imposing
liability where none exists by contract. The key to aggres-
sive plaintiff strategies in the settlement of claims against
insureds that may then give rise to ensuing bad faith or
extra-contractual responsibility on insurers is understand-
ing the role that conflicts of interest play in influencing
subsequent fact finders, as well as subsequent courts of
law. The fashioning of settlement offers to emphasize or
highlight the conflicting interests in a particular context
can be the critical difference in the bottom line determina-
tion of an insurer's ultimate liability beyond its policy, be
it a first-party or liability insurance case.
Similarly, the responsiveness and attentiveness of the
insurer to such offers require perhaps even greater imagi-
nation in avoidance of conflicts which are both inherent to
the insurer/insured relationship and prevalent in the in-
- Id.
112 Id. at 1290.
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surance industry practices. But a sensitivity to this prob-
lem and an attempt to address it will go a long way
towards reducing the insurer's exposure to the later made
extra-contractual liability claims by the insured or the in-
sured's assignee. An appreciation of these concerns is as
essential to estimating the potential liability insurers face
as is good underwriting practice in undertaking the insur-
ance risk. An appreciation of the consequences of not ad-
equately responding to the needs of the insured must be
brought home to defense counsel as well, so that they can
assist in the process rather than becoming a hindrance to
its execution. Kneejerk rejections of imaginative and unu-
sual settlement proposals may prove more costly in the
long run than acceptance (or, at least, further
negotiation).
